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Abstract—Measurements results are presented to evaluate the 
distance at which a carrier signal of 13.56MHz can be 
eavesdropped by a “rogue” antenna, which is transmitted by an 
inductive loop H-antenna, thus representative of a contactless 
payment device employing near field communication (NFC). 
Results are evaluated based on the magnetic H-fields used in the 
ISO14443 standard, while the ability to receive a carrier is based 
upon the minimum noise floor achievable by a radio receiver at 
such frequencies and bandwidths. Depending on the size of H-
field and the antenna design, measurements indicate that in 
general the maximum eavesdropping range with practical radio 
apparatus is largely due to the background noise, which larger 
antennas were susceptible to in the laboratory environment. 
Index Terms—NFC, eavesdropping, interrogation, H-antenna 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the fast emergence of near field communications 
(NFC) being used for contactless payment devices for 
convenience and ease of buying small items, there is growing 
concern over the security risks associated with transmitting 
such information wirelessly. Two particular threats, where the 
propagation of radio as well as design of antennas in the high 
frequency (HF) band is of interest, is that of eavesdropping and 
interrogation [1][2], whereby it is possible that data can be 
“listened” to while a transaction is taking place. More 
importantly however, there are also “skimming” attacks 
possible whereby a contactless payment device can be 
interrogated to send data back to an eavesdropper as it is 
passing by. Finally there are also the risks of “man in the 
middle” attacks, whereby it is assumed two contactless 
payment devices are communicating with each other, but in 
reality they are both communicating with the device acting as a 
man in the middle and bogusly appearing to be each device 
separately. In all these cases, the eavesdropping antenna may 
be at some distance away from both devices and its success 
will depend on how easily it is able to receive information 
transmitted by the inductive loop H-antenna used in the mobile 
device for NFC [3].  
While other publications have shown existing NFC devices 
to achieve a successful eavesdrop [2], they have addressed the 
topic from an end to end perspective, whereby the device is 
transmitting real data and it is evaluated as to whether the 
eavesdropped data can be quantified in any particular fashion. 
What is not known in such tests is the degree of H-field that the 
device transmits. It is only assumed that the reader device is 
transmitting within the ISO14443 standard, which requires a 
minimum H-field of 1.5A/m and a maximum of 7.5A/m, 
though the mobile device which receives from the reader is 
expected to emulate a passive card, which would normally 
backscatter the response back to the reader and is likely to be 
significantly less than 1.5A/m. Therefore the results presented 
in this paper evaluate the eavesdropping distance achievable 
from a H-antenna for H-fields between 0.5A/m and 7.5A/m. 
The results are divided into two parts, the first set of 
measurements verify the expected path loss using a spectrum 
analyser and different antenna designs, while the second set of 
results evaluate the distance at which a type A NFC signal 
using on off keying (OOK) modulation can be successfully 
recovered. 
II. MEASUREMENT SETUP 
The NFC antenna was set up as a circular coil antenna of 
one turn with a radius, rant, of 1.5cm. This resulted in a low 
inductance antenna of 0.3µH, which cannot be easily matched 
by reactive components alone and provide a wide bandwidth 
due to the high Q-factor such a circuit creates. Therefore a 
small resistance of 10Ω was placed in series with the inductive 
antenna as illustrated in figure 1, such that by using a Smith 
Chart [4], it was possible to suitably match the input to 50Ω  at 
13.56MHz using a parallel capacitance of 420pF, giving a 
return loss of greater than 10dB and a sufficient bandwidth.  
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Figure 1 – Tuning of an NFC antenna for measurement 
Knowing the loss caused by the introduction of the series 
resistance at 13.56MHz, which calculated to be less than 1dB 
and thus negligible, it is possible to ascertain the power and 
hence maximum current, I in the H-antenna, from which the 
magnetic H-field can be calculated by [5]: 
ant2r
IH =  
 
(1) 
In the measurements, sufficient current was induced in the 
H-antenna using a signal generator and power amplifier (with 
pad attenuators for protection) in order to achieve fields up to 
7.5A/m.  
The first rogue antenna consisted of a 5m wire, comparable to a 
quarter wavelength at 13.56MHz, which was placed over the 
eavesdropper’s body as illustrated in figure 2 and connected to 
a handheld spectrum analyser. 
 
Figure 2 – Photograph of the measurement setup and 
eavesdropper wearing a rogue antenna 
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 Figure 3 – Comparison of the reflection coefficient, s11 of a 
5m wire on the body, a rucksack and laid on the ground 
It is useful to study the vulnerability that such an antenna has 
with regards to de-tuning in different scenarios. Figure 3 
illustrates such cases where the wire was mounted onto the 
body in five different ways, then secondly it was mounted to a 
rucksack in another five ways while finally it was laid straight 
on the floor in five different positions to evaluate how the 
reflection coefficient, s11, measured with a network analyser, 
changes. Clearly it can be seen that in the case of the rucksack, 
the antenna is subject to much de-tuning and it is hard to keep 
its resonant frequency at a constant position. However in the 
case where the antenna is laid on the ground and round the 
body, there is little difference and thus the wire antenna can be 
considered to be more reliable when used in such a way. 
Though the antenna is not tuned to 13.56MHz for the ground 
case, a shorter wire could easily rectify this problem though it 
is not so practical to have a 5m long wire placed along the 
ground for eavesdropping purposes. The antenna being 
wrapped round the body of an eavesdropper is a more practical 
scenario where the tuning can be maintained, though 
undoubtedly efficiency will be compromised due to the water 
content of the body. 
The second rogue antenna was that of a shopping trolley, 
which could represent any large metallic structure in proximity 
to a contactless payment terminal such as a basket or shelving. 
Whatever the structure, a structure with a resistor and a 
capacitor such as that in figure 1 can be connected to two 
points on the shopping trolley in close proximity as previous 
measurements show that it is the most inductive at such a point 
[3]. The inductance was, however higher at 0.5µH, requiring a 
resistance of 30Ω and capacitance of 180pF to get close to the 
required impedance match. However, this will of course bring 
a further receiving loss to the antenna with the higher 
resistance required, which will be around 4dB. 
Finally the third antenna used more for purposes of comparison 
in the second set of tests was another inductive loop antenna 
similar to the one used as the transmit antenna. 
III. PATH LOSS MEASUREMENTS  
The first set of path loss measurements are presented in 
figure 4 using a rogue antenna wrapped around the body. These 
results show how the received power from the spectrum 
analyser in dBm changes over distance when comparing 
0.5A/m, 1.5A/m and 7.5A/m. Obviously for lower fields, the 
measured power levels fall below the noise floor of the 
spectrum analyser at a large distance. A minimal resolution 
bandwidth was also used in order to ensure maximum dynamic 
range of the measurements.  
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Figure 4 – Results comparing the propagation range 
against transmitted H-field 
A -111.9dBm noise floor is also inserted as a base line 
since it is assumed that for NFC, with two subcarriers 847kHz 
either side of the 13.56MHz carrier, that an eavesdropper 
would require a system bandwidth of approximately 1.6MHz 
with such minimum noise floor. It should be noted however, 
that in practice the noise floor of any receiver will be higher 
than this, not only due to noise in the radio and the noise figure 
of the receiver amplifier, but other background noise radiated 
by nearby electrical devices and also broadcast signals in the 
high frequency (HF) band [3]. The degree of such interference 
is highly dependent location.  
Concentrating on the 0.5A/m results, plotted in figure 5, 
further measurements are taken where they compare the power 
received versus distance but at different angles from the 
antenna, being 0o when directly in front of the loop of the H-
antenna and at 45o and 90o where it is tangential to the loop. 
Clearly there is little change in the received power. Thus at any 
radius away from the H-antenna, the power decays with a 1/r3 
proportionality as would be expected theoretically [5], where r 
is the distance from the loop. 
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Figure 5 – Results comparing the propagation range 
against angle for 0.5A/m and comparison to 1/r3 curve 
Similar measurements were carried out using a shopping 
trolley, though in this case, only H-fields of 0.5A/m, 1.5A/m 
and 4.5A/m were possible to carry out due to limitations of 
equipment used. Figure 5 shows the results of the 
measurements taken, where for 4.5A/m, the measurement was 
taken two times with the front of the trolley (where it was 
connected to the spectrum analyser) was facing the loop 
antenna, while in the second case the side of the trolley was 
facing the loop antenna.  
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Figure 6 – Comparison of path loss for measurements 
taken using a shopping trolley 
Measurements were out of dynamic range where the back of 
the trolley was facing the loop antenna. For 1.5A/m and 
0.5A/m measurements to the side of the trolley were excluded 
because they were out of dynamic range to obtain a meaningful 
set of results. For the 4.5A/m measurements, orientation of the 
trolley has little effect, while reducing the H-field to 0.5A/m 
reduces the received power by as much as 20dB. 
IV. MEASUREMENTS WITH A DEMODULATOR 
The second set of measurements took a full evaluation of 
the distance at which a type A modulation from an NFC 
device, which uses OOK modulation at a rate of 108kbps, thus 
a square wave with a frequency of roughly 108kHz was chosen 
to represent such a signal and evaluate whether it is recoverable 
by use of an oscilloscope. The measurement setup is shown in 
figure 7, where a rogue antenna (a shopping trolley in the case 
illustrated) is matched to 50Ω and connected to a low noise 
amplifer, which is then further amplified together with a filter 
within the 1.6MHz bandwidth used in NFC, thus creating a 
representative noise floor with additional system noise from the 
low noise amplifier and the peak detector, which acts as the 
demodulator in the case of OOK. This form of demodulator 
was chosen as it will result in the least amount of additional 
noise, which would otherwise occur from demodulation using a 
mixer, where the local oscillator will have additional phase 
noise. The operational amplifer was only required for purposes 
of compensating out losses in the filter and increasing the 
signal to a level detectable by the peak detector.  
Peak detector
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Amplifier
Filter
To Oscilloscope
Rogue antenna 
connected to amplifier
Operational
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Loop H-antenna transmitting 
modulated with a Square wave of 108kHz
Figure 7 – Diagram of the measurement setup for 
measuring the range at which a type A NFC signal can be 
successfully demodulated 
       In carrying out the measurements, the output was observed 
on the oscilloscope with an output similar to those shown in 
figure 8 (a) where the output of the peak detector can be 
identified to detect the square wave rising from zero to 1 as 
would be expected in OOK. In the case where the rogue 
antenna was moved too far away from the transmitting loop 
antenna, only a noise floor as observed in figure 8 (b) resulted 
from which it was deduced at the maximum distance that any 
detection would be possible.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 8 – Illustration of the oscilloscope output for a case 
where the signal is (a) recoverable and (b) in the noise 
      The measurement was carried out for three different values 
of transmitted magnetic H-field, 0.5A/m, 1.5A/m and 4.5A/m 
with the wire antenna around a body, the shopping trolley and 
another inductive loop all directly facing the transmitting loop. 
In table 1 the distances at which detection failed by observing 
the output at the oscilloscope are listed. In the case of the wire 
antenna there was no success in obtaining any measurements at 
such bandwidths due to the body causing coupling to the 
ground, from which high background noise from the 
surrounding environment (-56.5dBm as measured by the 
spectrum analyser) was significantly higher than what was 
detected from the transmitting loop and thus no deducable 
signal could be output to the oscilloscope.  
In contrast, the trolley was also subject to  significant 
background noise though over 10dB less than the case of the 
wire around the body at -64dBm. This resulted in the 
possibility to detect using the trolley though for all three cases 
of transmitting H-field this distance was less than 0.5m due to 
the fact that the background noise was still significantly high.  
Antenna 0.5A/m 
Dist (m) 
1.5A/m 
Dist (m) 
4.5A/m 
Dist (m) 
Background 
noise (dBm) 
Trolley 0.2 0.3 0.4 -64.0 
Wire - - - -56.5 
Loop 0.5 0.7 0.9 -91.2 
Table 1 – Comparison of the measurement ranges where a 
demodulated square wave could be recovered and the 
background noise received by each antenna 
Observing the measurements taken by the loop antenna, 
distances beyond 0.5m were possible to detect. Due to the 
significantly greater inefficiency of the antenna, the 
background noise was significantly lower down at -91.2dBm 
and since the transmitting loop and receiving loop were 
aligned, the signal to interference ratio compared to the other 
two antennas was substantially higher, thus allowing a longer 
detection range. It should be noted that these measurements 
were carried out in a laboratory environment, which will be 
subject to a range of background radiation both from broadcast 
signals in the HF band but also emissions from electrical 
appliances such as computers that were in the vicinity. 
Therefore in cases where background radiation is likely to be 
significantly lower (such as in underground locations) the 
higher efficiency of the other two antennas will be subject to a 
lower signal to noise ratio and the possibility of a longer 
measurement range. However, the results clarify that for retail 
outlets often based on ground level, the background radiation is 
significantly high enough that it will make eavesdropping from 
contactless payment terminals, or interrogation from a nearby 
distance, to be only possible at distances up to 0.5m using 
practical antennas and radio apparatus.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Results presented here show the first analysis of the 
propagation range of H-fields from NFC H-antennas using 
realistic designs of rogue antenna for eavesdropping. These 
results are limited to scenarios above or on ground level where 
the eavesdropper is subjected to high levels of background 
noise from nearby electrical appliances or HF broadcast 
signals. Clearly the presence of background noise is a good 
counter measure to prevent interrogation and eavesdropping of 
NFC devices, though it is certain that the risk is higher from 
more secluded locations, where there is less availability of 
background noise.  
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